School
Bus/Dump Truck Collision:
Central Bridge, New York
On November 14, 2000, the National
Transportation Safety Board released its final report on
the investigation of the tragic school bus/dump truck crash
that occurred on October 21, 1999, in Central Bridge, New
York. The Executive Summary, Conclusions, Probable Cause,
and Safety Recommendations from that report follow.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of November 14, 2000
Abstract of Final Report
(Subject to Editing)
Highway Accident Report
School Bus and Dump Truck Collision
Central Bridge, New York
October 21, 1999
This is an abstract from the Safety Board's
report and does not include the Board's rationale for the
conclusions and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff
is currently making final revisions to the report from which
the attached conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations
have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety
recommendation letters wi11 be distributed to recommendation
recipients and investigation parties as soon as possible.
The following information is subject to further review and
editing.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
At about 10:30am on October 21, 1999 in Schoharie County,
New York, a Kinnicut Bus Company school bus was transporting
44 students, 5 to 9 years, old, and 8 adults on an Albany
City School No. 18 field trip. The bus was traveling north
on State Route 30A as it approached the intersection of
State Route 7, which is about 1.5 miles east of Central
Bridge, New York. Concurrently, an MVF Construction Company
dump truck, towing a utility trailer, was traveling west
on State Route 7. The dump truck was occupied by the driver
and a passenger. As the bus approached the intersection,
it failed to stop as required and was stuck by the dump
truck. Seven bus passengers sustained serious injuries;
28 bus passengers and the truck driver received minor injuries.
Thirteen bus passengers, the bus driver and the truck passenger
were uninjured.
The following major safety issues were identified
in this accident:
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The adequacy of commercial vehicle brake
inspections;
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The potential for passenger injuries
as a result of the school bus side emergency exit door
design; and
-
The potential for passenger injuries
as a result of school bus seat cushion bottoms that are
removable or hinged.
The medical fitness of commercial drivers
and the medical examination for the commercial driver's
license were also identified as safety issues; however,
these issues will be analyzed in a forthcoming Safety Board
special investigation report.
As a result of this accident, the Safety Board
adopted safety recommendation to the National Highway traffic
Safety Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation
Services, Maintenance Council of the American Trucking Association,
and Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance.
-
CONCLUSIONS
Sufficient traffic control warnings were provided to alert
drivers to stop.
-
Although the dump truck and trailer had
several mechanical defects, including a leaking air hose,
those defects neither had an adverse effect on the vehicle's
performance nor reduced the vehicle's braking capacity,
and, therefore, the condition of the dump truck and trailer
was not a factor in this accident.
-
The bus driver's performance may have
been affected by factors associated with aging.
-
The bus driver's performance may have
been affected by his medical condition.
-
It could not be determined whether being
restrained by the lap belts available to the occupants
of the school bus reduced the risk of injury from the
accident.
-
The potential exists for injuries to school
bus passengers seated adjacent to side emergency exits
with protruding door handles and latches during side impact
or rollover accidents.
-
The school bus passengers, whether lap
belt restrained or unrestrained, may have sustained more
severe injuries because the seat cushion bottoms were
unlatched.
-
`When inspecting the tractor protection
system, inspectors may have assumed during the first inspection
step that the tractor protection system was present and
working as required, so they did not perform the second
step, which was applying the service brake.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines
that the probable cause of this accident was the school
bus driver's failure to stop for the stop sign due to his
degraded performance or lapse of attention as a result of
factors associated with aging or his medical condition or
both.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation
safety Board makes the following recommendations:
--To the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration:
1. Modify the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards to prohibit protruding door handles or latching
mechanisms on emergency exit doors.
2. Modify the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards to include the requirement that school bus seat
cushion bottoms be installed with fail-safe latching devices
to ensure they remain in their installed position during
impacts and rollovers. (H-OO-XX)
--To the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration:
3. Advise relevant staff of the importance
of the requiring a brake application during inspections
of tractor protection systems and the consequences of not
doing so, as evidenced by the circumstance of this accidents
(H-OO-XX)
--To the National Association of State
Directors of Pupil Transportation Services:
4. Inform your members again of the safety
hazards of not ensuring that the seat cushion bottom latching
clips are properly latched at all times. (H-OO-XX)
5. Inform your members of the potential for
injury to child passengers from protruding door handles
or latching mechanisms on side emergency exit doors. Consider
not placing children in those seat positions adjacent to
side emergency exit doors.
--To the Maintenance Council of the American
Trucking Associations and the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance:
6. Advise your members of the importance of
requiring a brake application during inspections of tractor
protection systems and the consequences of not doing to,
as evidenced by the circumstances of this accident. (H-OO-XX)
The Safety board also reiterated the following
safety recommendations to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration:
H-99-045
In 2 years, develop performance standards for School
bus occupant protection systems that account for frontal
impact collisions, side impact collisions, rear impact
collisions, and rollovers.
Once pertinent standards have been developed
for school bus occupant protection systems, require newly
manufactured school buses to have an occupant crash protection
system that meets the newly developed performance standards
and retains passengers, including those in child safety
restraint systems, within the seating compartment throughout
the accident sequence for all accident scenarios.
The School Bus Information
Council believes the Safety Board did a thorough and careful
investigation of the crash, as reflected in the Conclusions
and Probable Cause. The seriousness of the issues identified
in this report can not be overstated. Of particular interest
are the factors that may have affected the school bus driver's
performance. These factors would apply to drivers of any
motor vehicle, not just a school bus.
Additionally, it is noteworthy
that the Safety Board was unable to determine whether the
lap belts that were installed in this school bus actually
reduced the risk of injury to any child that was restrained
by the lap belt. This conclusion is consistent with the
findings and conclusions of all other Safety Board investigations
that have been conducted during the past two decades.
The School Bus Information
Council believes the Safety Recommendations issued by the
Safety Board deserve full consideration by the organizations
to which they were made.
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